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Abstract
I investigate: (1) to what extent do folk ascriptions of lying differ between casual 
and courtroom contexts? (2) to what extent does motive (reason) to lie influence 
ascriptions of trust, mental states, and lying judgments? (3) to what extent are lying 
judgments consistent with previous ascriptions of communicated content? Follow-
ing the Supreme Court’s Bronston judgment, I expect: (1) averaged lying judgments 
to be similar in casual and courtroom contexts; (2) motive to lie to influence levels 
of trust, mental states ascriptions, and patterns of lying judgments; (3) retrospective 
judgments of lying, after being presented with the state of the world, to be incon-
sistent with previous judgments of communicated content: participants hold the 
protagonist responsible for content she did not communicate. I performed a survey 
experiment on the Qualtrics platform. Participants were recruited through Amazon 
Mechanical Turk (N = 630). I employed standard Likert scales and forced-choice 
questions. I found that: (1) average lying judgments are similar in casual and court-
room contexts; (2) motive to lie decreases trust ascription and increases lying judg-
ment; (3) judgments of lying are inconsistent with previous judgments of communi-
cated content: participants hold the protagonist responsible for content they did not 
communicate (effect size of the difference d = .69). Perjury ascriptions are incon-
sistent. The Supreme Court’s worries expressed in the Bronston judgment are well 
founded. This article helps reforming jury instructions in perjury cases.
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Samuel Bronston, the owner of Samuel Bronston Productions based in New York, 
made movies in various European countries to lower the movie production costs. As 
discovered later, he therefore kept bank accounts in 37 different countries. In 1964, 
after one of the company’s big movie productions, The Fall of the Roman Empire, 
proved a financial catastrophe, Bronston filed for federal bankruptcy protection. 
During the court proceedings, Bronston was questioned under oath about his off-
shore bank accounts by a lawyer representing his creditors. The following exchange 
ensued:
Question. Do you have any bank accounts in Swiss banks, Mr. Bronston?
Answer. No, sir.
Q. Have you ever?
A. The company had an account there for about six months, in Zürich.
Q. Have you any nominees who have bank accounts in Swiss banks?
A. No, sir.
Q. Have you ever?
A. No, sir. [10]
All the answers were literally true. However, the answer “the company had an 
account there for about six months, in Zürich” suggests that Bronston himself had no 
bank account in Switzerland, yet it was later discovered that he had one in Geneva. 
Consequently, following this discovery, federal prosecutors secured a perjury indict-
ment against Mr. Bronston. The court had to answer the question whether Bronston 
lied.
The jury was instructed to think about Bronston’s mental state and find out 
whether he “fully understood the questions put to him but nevertheless gave false 
answers knowing the same to be false”1 [10]. After a long discussion, the jury con-
victed Bronston. The lay jury verdict was clear: Bronston lied.
However, Bronston’s lawyers appealed, claiming that he never said anything 
false, and it was the questioning prosecutor’s duty to press Bronston to elaborate 
on the matter. Since the prosecutor did not ask additional questions and Bronston 
had no obligation to speak more precisely, Bronston was, in their view, innocent. 
1 Currently, US law only specifies testimony that the defendant “does not believe to be true.” 81
 The 1911 UK Perjury statute has a slightly different wording:
 If any person lawfully sworn as a witness or as an interpreter in a judicial proceeding wilfully makes a 
statement material in that proceeding, which he knows [emphasis added] to be false or does not believe to 
be true, he shall be guilty of perjury,… 80
 If any person, in giving any testimony (either orally or in writing) otherwise than on oath, where 
required to do so by an order under Sect.  2 of the Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act 
1975, makes a statement:
 (a) which he knows to be false in a material particular, or.
 (b) which is false in a material particular and which he does not believe to be true,
 he shall be guilty of an offence… 79
 Choice of rules from [35].
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After appeals, the case reached the Supreme Court, who reversed the jury judgment 
and upheld the appeal: Bronston did not lie. The Supreme Court feared that in such 
courtroom cases, folk intuitions about lying would not be robust, as well as that they 
would not be consistent, and therefore would be easily manipulable [10]. This deci-
sion drew massive criticism. The Supreme Court was accused of creating a loop-
hole in the perjury statutes that would permit witnesses to lie in court without con-
sequences. The Bronston case influenced thousands of further perjury trials. This 
case was also used later in the perjury proceedings involving President Bill Clinton, 
which raised a huge public controversy [18].,2
So, who is right? Are folk intuitions about perjury robust? Or is the Supreme 
Court (SC) correct that this is shaky ground where one should proceed with extreme 
caution? This study recruited survey participants and performed a quantitative anal-
ysis of their responses to the question.
2  The Supreme Court’s Two Major Worries
The SC had two major worries. The first one concerned context type. The SC feared 
that lying means something different in casual, everyday contexts than in a court-
room setting. The SC stated its opinion:
There is, indeed, an implication in the answer to the second question that there 
was never a personal bank account; in casual conversation this interpretation 
might reasonably be drawn. But we are not dealing with casual conversation 
and the statute does not make it a criminal act for a witness to willfully state 
any material matter that implies any material matter that he does not believe to 
be true [10].
Thus, the SC suggested here that there is a qualitative difference in what constitutes 
a lie in a casual and a courtroom context and juries do not see the difference [34, 
68].
The second major worry of the SC is that there is a class of court proceedings 
such as bankruptcy proceedings that is special because the witness has a motive 
(reason) to mislead:
2 Interestingly, the legal discussion on the Bronston case is mirrored by a discussion in philosophy of 
language where Jorg Meibauer argues that indirect answers such as Bronston’s are lies [48, 49], while 
Jennifer Saul argues that such indirect answers should not be taken as lies but as merely misleading state-
ments (even if the folk treats them as lies) (cf. also [1, 14, 65]). This claim is also advocated by Solan 
and Tiersma [ 67], Tiersma [75, 76] as the ‘literal truth defense’: lying requires (knowingly) false state-
ments, and as the Supreme Court noted, Bronston’s statements were not false.
 Others argue that this depends whether the false inference from the answer would arise in most contexts 
or only in a special, particular context [19, 21, 34, 50, 68]. Moreover, there is a considerable literature 
which tests these claims empirically but does so outside of the courtroom context (cf. for instance [77]), 
which has been criticized by Wiegmann et al. [85]. Recent empirical findings point out to the crucial role 
of the notion of commitment (cf. [58, 86]).
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It should come as no surprise that a participant in a bankruptcy proceeding 
may have something to conceal and consciously tries to do so, or that a debtor 
may be embarrassed at his plight and yield information reluctantly [10].
The SC feared that this motive might generate low trust levels toward the speaker’s 
words, which might in turn generate inconsistencies in jurors’ perjury judgments: 
the speaker might be held responsible for content she did not communicate. This 
issue is especially pressing as there is a maxim in legal interpretation that states that 
motive is irrelevant to responsibility if one is not sure whether the accused really 
acted upon the motive (cf., for instance, [53, 59]). Moreover, in continental legal 
systems, for instance in France, considering motives is prohibited when evaluat-
ing whether the agent acted with general intent. In other words, motives are irrel-
evant for ascriptions of general intent, except when the code explicitly states that 
a concrete motive is needed [5, 7, 20, 57]. However, empirical studies depict that 
when experiment participants ascribe intention, they consider ‘the agent’s reasons or 
motives for acting when computing blame’ (45, cf. also [44, 51], see also [39]).
3  Indirect Answers
When asked whether he had ever any bank accounts in Swiss banks, Bronston 
replied, “The company had an account there for about six months, in Zürich.” The 
answer suggests that Bronston himself did not have an account in a Swiss bank. In 
the philosophy of language, this suggestion is called an implicature. In fact, in eve-
ryday speech, it is quite common to convey more than just the the meanings of the 
words we utter. If A asks B in the morning, “Are you hungry?” and B replies, “I 
have just had breakfast,” then B implies that she is not hungry even though she does 
not explicitly state that. Paul Grice labeled such indirect answers “conversational 
implicatures”. He claimed that we can convey implicatures because we all share a 
common communicative assumption named the “cooperative principle”: “Make 
your contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted 
purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged” [28].
According to Grice, this principle can be unpacked into four conversational 
maxims:
1. Quality: (1) do not say what you believe to be false; (2) do not say that for which 
you lack adequate evidence.
2. Quantity: (1) make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current 
purposes of the exchange); (2) do not make your contribution more informative 
than is required.
3. Relation: be relevant.
4. Manner: be perspicuous; (1) avoid obscurity of expression; (2) avoid ambiguity; 
(3) be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity); (4) be orderly [28].
The above framework laid the groundwork for modern theories in the philoso-
phy of language, which refined it, yet kept it (with various modifications) as a good 
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basis for describing everyday linguistic communication. However, when language 
exchanges in the legal realm are at stake, scholars have pointed out that this frame-
work leads to different inferences than in everyday speech because the goal of the 
exchange is different. This is because in such exchanges, the main goal is rarely to 
just transmit information one has. Rather, the goal is to win the case, and this might 
involve a highly selective sharing of information that maximizes the chances of win-
ning. This results in either different patterns of implicature ascriptions or in refrain-
ing from implicature inference because it is uncertain what the maxim of quantity 
(be as informative as required for the puprposes of the exchange) requires [23, 43, 
46, 47, 55, 56, 66, 69, 78]. Take the following example provided by Marmor:
Consider, for example, a stipulation in some commercial contract saying “X 
will not issue A without Y’s proof of B.” In an ordinary conversation, a hearer 
would have inferred that proof of B is the only condition for X to issue A; 
otherwise, the speaker would have flouted the maxim of quantity (do not say 
too little). But in the context of commercial negotiations, this would be a very 
insecure inference. X might want to be able to claim that stating one condition 
does not necessarily preclude others, and Y might be expected to know this, to 
some extent, and to know that this might be what X presumes in the conversa-
tional context [emphasis added] [47].
In the above example, the sentence “X will not issue A without Y’s proof of B” does 
not automatically give rise to the implicature that Y’s proof of B is the only condi-
tion for issuing A, because we are in a special context. In the context of commercial 
negotiations, one is expected to be cautious because one knows that the interlocutor 
might want to leave matters open, and thus it is safer not to infer that Y’s proof of B 
is the only condition for issuing A. It is especially not clear what the maxim of quan-
tity requires, and the negotiating parties know that.3
The SC’s worry about Bronston’s utterance is analogous: in the courtroom con-
text, Bronston’s answer should not automatically give rise to the inference that 
he himself did not have a bank account in Switzerland, because a hearer is also 
expected to be cautious, though for a slightly different reason. As the SC phrased it, 
“A participant in a bankruptcy proceeding may have something to conceal,” [10] and 
thus she is to be distrusted. Thus, an analysis analogous to Marmor’s example leads 
to the claim that hearers would refrain from implicature inference in the courtroom. 
There is, however, a competing analysis of what happens in a distrust context like 
the one described. As Claudia Bianchi argues:
3 To give another example, in an every-day context, when you hear ‘If you mow the lawn I’ll give you 
$5′ you infer that if you don’t mow the lawn I won’t give you the money. This is labeled ‘conditional 
perfection’, the inference from “If p then q” to “Only if p, q” (or, equivalently, to “If not-p then not-
q”), which can be accounted for as an implicature. Yet there can be contexts in which this inference is 
blocked (cf. [24, 82, 32]).
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In a strategy of Naïve Optimism,4 following the assumption that Bronston is 
both benevolent (obeying Grice’s Maxims, and in particular the first Maxim of 
Quantity) and competent, his utterance
 (8)  The company had an account there for about 6 months, in Zurich will be 
taken to imply
 (9)  I have never had a personal bank account in a Swiss bank.
In more sophisticated strategies, however, the addressee shouldn’t stop at the 
first relevant enough interpretation that comes to mind ((9)). A Cautious Opti-
mist should stop at the first interpretation that the speaker might have thought 
would be relevant enough to the interpreter. Bronston could be benevolent 
but not competent, and think that, say, only the Company bank accounts are 
relevant in a bankruptcy hearing: in this case (8), not (9), would be the most 
relevant interpretation that Bronston might have thought would be relevant 
enough to the Court. Nonetheless, the adequate strategy in the Bronston case 
is Sophisticated Understanding: the examining lawyer should have dropped 
the assumption of benevolence and interpreted Bronston as merely intending 
to seem benevolent and informative, and avoid lying. The lawyer should have 
identified (9) not as the truly relevant interpretation, but only as the interpreta-
tion Bronston might have thought would seem relevant enough to the Court 
([8], p. 196).
Bianchi argues that in the Bronston case, a hearer should infer the implicature 
yet disbelieve the speaker. However, do people descriptively speaking behave this 
way when processing utterances in the courtroom? Or rather, do they refrain from 
implicature inference as Marmor suggests? In this empirical study, I will investi-
gate which claim, Marmor’s or Bianchi’s, is supported by psychological data.
To reiterate, Marmor claims that: in a distrust context like the Bronston case, 
participants do not know whether the speaker follows the maxim of quantity. As a 
result, they refrain from implicature inference. For example, in the Bronston case, 
they take Bronston as communicating that perhaps he had a personal bank account 
in a Swiss bank. In other words, participants understand that Bronston’s utterance 
about the company does not preclude that he himself had an account.
By contrast, Bianchi claims that participants’ beliefs about what is communicated 
and about the state of the world diverge. Consequently, participants understand the 
implicature yet disbelieve the speaker. For example, in the Bronston case, they take 
Bronston as communicating that he himself did not have an account in a Swiss bank. 
4 This is a strategy introduced by D. Sperber: “Suppose John is very trusting indeed and takes for 
granted that Carol is behaving both benevolently and competently. Then John can take for granted two 
further things: that the information Carol wants to convey to him is information worth his attention, 
and that the means she is using to convey that information should make it as easy as possible for him 
to retrieve it” [71]. The idea of different degrees of relevance of the speech depending on the strategy 
adopted was introduced in the so-called Relevance Theory [72].
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However, they do not believe in what Bronston communicates; they think that the 
state of the world is the opposite: Bronston had an account in a Swiss bank.
The first step of this empirical study was to check which account, Marmor’s or 
Bianchi’s, is closer to the psychological reality of processing utterances in a court-
room. The second step, dependent on the first, was to check whether the SC’s worry 
about the inconsistency of folk intuitions about lying is well founded. The second 
step consisted of providing participants with explicit information that the putative 
implicature was false. For example, it provided participants with the information 
that Bronston indeed had a personal bank account in a Swiss bank and asked partici-
pants whether Bronston had lied.
The conclusion drawn from the results collected in the second experimental step 
is dependent on the results of the first experimental step because if it turned out that 
Bianchi is correct (participants first infer the implicature and next when the implica-
ture turns out false judge it as a lie5), then the SC’s worry is unfounded: participants 
will consistently assess false communicated content as a lie. To take the Bronston 
example, they will first assess that Bronston communicated that he himself did not 
have an account, and second, since it turns out not to be true, participants will assess 
this as a lie.
By contrast, if it turns out that Marmor is correct (participants first refrain from 
implicature inference and next when the putative implicature turns out false judge it 
as a lie), then the SC’s worry is very well founded: participants will hold the protag-
onist responsible for something she did not communicate, which is unfair. For exam-
ple, participants will assess that Bronston communicated that he does not preclude 
he had an account, and later, when it turns out that Bronston indeed had an account, 
participants inconsistently assess the initial Bronston’s utterance as a lie.
4  Scalar Implicatures
There are many types of implicatures [40], but in the paper, I focus entirely on scalar 
implicatures (the Bronston case can be considered a variety of those, see below), 
which have been widely debated in the literature. Scalar implicatures arise in most 
contexts where the words giving rise to them are employed [27, 36, 41]. There is 
a heated debate on their exact nature [25, 64], and many claim that certain scalar 
implicatures are even within the dictionary meaning of the words that give rise 
to the inference of these scalar implicatures [11, 41],similarly claiming that sca-
lar inferences can be explained with a semantic operator “only”: [12, 13, 22],for a 
5 One note of caution for Bianchi’s account: in my experimental design I employ a major simplifica-
tion, namely I do not ask separate questions on lying and misleading. I do it on the assumption that 
participants thinking that the assessed false implicature is merely misleading will not judge it as a lie, in 
accordance with the findings of Weissman and Terkourafi [84]. When this is the case, then no problem 
for perjury arises since a jury so thinking would not convict the speaker of perjury, thinking that the false 
implicature is merely misleading rather than a lie and the speaker believed her statement to be true. Anal-
ogously, on Marmor’s account, participants who do not infer the implicature at all cannot consider it mis-
leading, since they have not inferred it in the first place. Thus, in such case no perjury conviction ensues.
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different view cf. [4, 25, 31, 54, 60, 63, 70]. In the experiment, when testing whether 
people refrain from implicature inference in a distrust context, I employed scalar 
implicatures.
So, what is a scalar implicature? When people hear that the company had an 
account in Zurich, they infer that the speaker did not, otherwise he would have said 
he had one. Analogously, when people hear that some of the invoices are unpaid, 
they infer that not all of them have been paid and there is at least one uncovered 
invoice. They do so because had the speaker wanted to convey that all the invoices 
are unpaid, she would have used the word “all” rather than “some.” The tradi-
tional account calls this reasoning a “scale” consisting of two words: “some” and 
“all.” Very roughly, if a speaker uses a word that is lower on the scale (for exam-
ple, “some”), then the speaker communicates the negation of the word higher on the 
scale (for example, “all”) [33].
Analogously, in the Bronston case, one could conceive of the answer as a scale 
constituted of ‘[only] the company has an account’ and ‘the speaker has an account’. 
If Bronston said that the company had an account, then he implicated the negation 
of ‘the speaker has an account’. However, the Bronston example is more complex 
than the ‘some’ example, since the scale inferences in the Bronston case do not only 
involve the maxim of quantity (say as much as you can), but also the maxim of rela-
tion (be relevant in answering the posed question, which concerned the speaker’s 
bank accounts) (cf. [67]). In order to keep the experimental setting as simple as pos-
sible, the present studies will focus on the less complex ‘some’ example, however, 
testing more complex cases with a question under discussion remain an avenue for 
future inquiry.
The above described scale explanation of scalar implicatures can be debated, but 
for our purposes it suffices to say that the label “scalar” for this type of implicatures 
comes from the idea that perhaps such scales explain the processing of the described 
implicatures. The “not all” inference from ‘some’ can be debated as an implicature. 
Consider the sentence uttered in the context of a company undergoing bankruptcy 
proceedings:
(1) If some of the invoices are unpaid, then the accountant will be fired.
Here the inference is that if all the invoices are unpaid, then the accountant will 
naturally also be fired. This is a ‘downward entailing context’ given the reversal of 
informative strength and thus the reversal of the scale: the replacement of “some” 
by “all” yields a weaker rather than stronger statement [41]. Thus, the meaning of 
“some” is “some and maybe all” instead of “some but not all.”
To test the SC’s claims presented in the Bronston case, I needed an experimen-
tal setting in a courtroom context where I was able to check whether participants 
who have a decreased trust toward the speaker, when presented with the utterance 
that can give rise to scalar implicature, e.g. “some of the invoices are unpaid”, 
indeed treat “some” as communicating “at least some and maybe all the invoices are 
unpaid.” If this is the case, then the next step was to tell participants that it turned 
out that all the invoices were indeed unpaid and check whether they then considered 
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the utterance a lie. If they did consider the utterance a lie, just as in the Bronston 
case, then the SC’s conclusion that folk intuitions about lies in courtrooms are 
inconsistent is correct: participants hold the speaker responsible for something she 
did not communicate, namely that there is a covered invoice (not all the invoices are 
unpaid), which would be unfair (Table 1).
5  Intent to Mislead is Irrelevant to Responsibility for Perjury
Before proceeding further, one more crucial terminological clarification. In the phi-
losophy of language literature, following a long tradition, Jennifer Saul argues that 
there is a distinction between intending to deceive and intending to mislead. Inten-
tion to deceive is the case when, very roughly, the speaker utters a statement she 
believes to be false. Such behavior is, according to Saul, labeled lying. By contrast, 
if the speaker utters a true statement which yields a false implicature (or an impli-
cature the speaker believes to be false), then the speaker is merely misleading, yet 
cannot automatically be labeled a liar. Saul extensively argues that misleading is not 
morally better than lying, with however one exception: the courtroom context. The 
reason for this exception is that in the courtroom, if a witness utters a false state-
ment, then the questioning lawyer has no duty to clarify it. By contrast, if the wit-
ness utters a statement with a suspicious implicature, then it is the duty of the lawyer 
to clarify it and so the burden of responsibility is not on the witness:
In a courtroom, a witness is required to answer the questions that a lawyer puts 
to them. If either of the lawyers in an adversarial system is not satisfied with 
their answers, it is the lawyer’s job to pursue the questions further. The law-
yers are trained professionals, well versed in these matters. It is very much the 
lawyer’s job to notice that a witness is not answering the question asked, and 
to force them to answer the right question. As a result, the lawyer question-
Table 1  The structure of Marmor’s and Bianchi’s predictions concerning the processing of an utterance 
containing the word “some” as well as the Supreme Court’s worry of judgment inconsistency
 I. Skoczeń 
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ing Bronston had a responsibility to press Bronston further on his misleading 
statement. [65]
In the remaining parts of the paper, I will not employ Saul’s distinction in the sense 
that I will write of intent to mislead as leading to potential lies. I do so because, just 
as the SC, I suspect that lay participants will not make this crucial difference in the 
courtroom context, which could potentially lead to unfair convicitons of perjury.
Moreoever, if the SC’s above described predictions turn out to be accurate and 
participants indeed hold the speaker responsible for something she did not commu-
nicate, then there remains the question as to the cause of such inconsistent judgment. 
Perhaps due to the fact that the state of the world turned out contrary to the not 
inferred implicature, participants retrospectively blamed the protagonist for trying 
to fool them and ascribed to the protagonist an intent to mislead them with the utter-
ance? If this is the case, then, as the SC points out, it is precisely what a jury should 
not do:
It is no answer to say that here the jury found that petitioner intended to mis-
lead his examiner. A jury should not be permitted to engage in conjecture 
whether an unresponsive answer, true and complete on its face, was intended 
to mislead or divert the examiner; the state of mind of the witness is relevant 
only to the extent that it bears on whether “he does not believe [his answer] to 
be true.” To hold otherwise would be to inject a new and confusing element 
into the adversary testimonial system we know. Witnesses would be unsure of 
the extent of their responsibility for the misunderstandings and inadequacies of 
examiners and might well fear having that responsibility tested by a jury under 
the vague rubric of “intent to mislead” or “perjury by implication” [10].
In other words, according to the SC, it is not relevant to the offense of perjury 
whether the witness had a desire to mislead for which the witness is to be blamed. 
The only question that matters is whether the witness did not believe her answer to 
be true. Yet Bronston believed that his utterance was true. Note that the structure of 
the offense of perjury is different than for example the distinction between voluntary 
and involuntary manslaughter, in which distinction the ascription of intent (and most 
probably desire) is clearly decisive.
In the experiment I will measure whether participants indeed blame the speaker 
for her words. To reiterate, if I find that participants are guided by their judgments 
of blame in their determinations of perjury, then participants will be interpolating 
a criterion which is not actually part of either the definition of perjury or the folk 
theory of lying (which includes an intention to deceive but not a judgment of blame 
per se). Consequently, if the blame criterion proves robust, then it might be the case 
that judgments of lying are biased by blame ascriptions.
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6  The Hypotheses and Experimental Design
6.1  The Ex Ante Probability
In order to distinguish an implicature from a prior belief that it is unlikely that all 
objects have the property [26], I first presented participants with the following 
information:
Invoices for more than a 1,000,000 USD found in the documentation of com-
panies in bankruptcy proceedings are almost always unpaid. A paid invoice 
of this kind is an extreme rarity. On the table, there are five invoices for more 
than 1,000,000 USD from a company undergoing bankruptcy proceedings.
Next, I asked a question on the probability of all objects having the property before 
being presented with an utterance, to make sure participants assessed it as high 
(above 50%). I measured probability on a 0–100 slider scale, as it is natural to speak 
of probability in terms of percentages [37]:
On a scale from 0 (completely unlikely) to 100 (certain) how likely is it that all 
of the invoices are unpaid?
I supposed that the answers to this question would be over 50% i.e. participants 
would understand that there is a high probability that all of the invoices are unpaid.
6.2  The Three Context Types
Recall that in the Bronston judgment, the SC had two major worries. The first worry 
was that juries do not make the distinction between casual and courtroom contexts 
in their lying judgments. The second worry was that the existence of a motive to lie 
generates inconsistencies in the jury’s lying judgments.
In order to verify whether the two worries are well-founded, I designed three con-
text types: (1) a neutral context, (2) a courtroom context without an explicitly stated 
motive to lie, and (3) a courtroom context with an explicitly stated motive to lie. I 
employed a between-subjects design and first split participants into three groups. 
Each participant was presented with only one of the following three context descrip-
tions containing the exact same utterance (the content in brackets was not presented 
to participants):
[neutral] Imagine a conversation at the company headquarters. The main 
accountant of the company says in reply to the boss’ question during the con-
versation at the company’s headquarters: ‘Some of the invoices are unpaid.’
[courtroom no explicit motive] Imagine a courtroom hearing. The main 
accountant of the company says in reply to the judge’s question during the 
courtroom hearing: ‘Some of the invoices are unpaid.’
[courtroom with explicit motive] Imagine a courtroom hearing. The main 
accountant of the company undergoing the bankruptcy proceedings has inter-
est in claiming that there is a paid invoice because this increases his chances of 
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receiving substantial remuneration before the company is declared bankrupt. 
The main accountant of the company says in reply to the judge’s question dur-
ing the courtroom hearing: ‘Some of the invoices are unpaid.
6.3  The Ex Post Probability
Next, I asked a question on the ex post (after being presented with utterance) prob-
ability that all the objects had the relevant property:
Now, on a scale from 0 (completely unlikely) to 100 (certain) how likely is it 
that all of the invoices are unpaid?
In a paired samples t test, I compared the answers to this question with the answers 
to the question on the ex ante (before being presented with utterance) probability 
that all objects had the property by the same participants (within-subjects). If there 
was a significant difference between the answers on ex ante and ex post probabil-
ity of all objects having the property, then participants understood and believed the 
speaker that not all the objects had the property and updated their beliefs about the 
world accordingly. Following the SC’s reasoning (Sect. 2) I predicted most partici-
pants would answer in this way because this is the standard inference in everyday 
communication contexts and, as pointed out in the introduction, the SC claims that 
there is no major difference between inferences in such everyday casual and court-
room contexts.
6.4  The Communicated Content
However, if there is no significant difference between assessment of ex ante and ex 
post probability of all objects having the property, then following the two alternative 
interpretations, by Marmor and Bianchi (Sect.  3), participants have either under-
stood and believed the speaker as claiming that perhaps even all the objects had the 
property, or participants have disbelieved the speaker, whom they understood to be 
precluding that all objects had the property. In order to disentangle these two pos-
sibilities, I added an additional, forced-choice question on communicated content 
(Fig. 1):
When uttering “Some of the invoices are unpaid” the main accountant wanted 
to communicate that: (a) only some but not all of the invoices are unpaid. (b) at 
least some and maybe all of the invoices are unpaid.6
I randomized the order of answer presentation. I assumed that those who assessed 
ex ante and ex post probability similarly (no significant difference) and chose the 
answer “At least some and maybe all of the objects have the property” to the ques-
tion on communicated content understood and believed the speaker as claiming that 
6 Note that if I asked simply what the speaker communicated, then the number of ‘some and maybe all’ 
answers would be even higher.
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perhaps even all the objects had the property. This means that these participants 
refrained from implicature inference, which is Marmor’s prediction described in 
Sect. 3 (cf. [17, 47, 84, 87]).
By contrast, those who assessed ex ante and ex post probability similarly (no sig-
nificant difference) and chose the answer “Some but not all of the objects have the 
property” disbelieved the speaker, whom they understood to be precluding that all 
objects had the property. This means that these participants inferred the implicature 
that not all the objects had the property, but since they disbelieved the speaker, their 
beliefs about what was communicated and about the state of the world were diver-
gent. This is Bianchi’s prediction described in Sect. 3 [8].
6.5  Trust
Following the SC’s ruling as well as Marmor and Bianchi’s diagnoses of the dis-
cussed courtroom contexts, I suggest that in both putative cases where there will 
not be a significant difference between the ex ante and ex post rating (the first being 
a lack of implicature inference and the second a disbelief in the speaker’s commu-
nicated content), participants distrust the speaker’s presented utterance. In order 
to investigate whether this is the case, I asked a question on trust assessment on a 
standard 1–7 Likert scale:
To what extent is the main accountant’s utterance trustworthy? (1 = not at all 
trustworthy; 7 = completely trustworthy)
Based on the SC’s second worry described in Sect.  2, I suggested that the over-
all trust assessment would be significantly lower in the courtroom contexts with 
the presence of an explicitly stated motive to lie (this was checked in an independ-
ent samples t test between context types). I also suggested that participants who 
answered the trust question over the mid-point 4, which means that they trusted 
the speaker’s words, would provide significantly different answers on ex ante and 
ex post probability assessment of all objects having the property. Moreover, I sug-
gested that these participants would choose the answers “Some but not all of the 
objects have the property” to the question on communicated content most of the 
time. I based this prediction on the SC claim that folk intuitions about casual and the 
courtroom contexts do not differ if there is no difference in trust levels.
Since the question on communicated content was a forced-choice question, I 
measured the frequency of answers assessing communicated content with a non-
parametric chi-square test. I compared whether there was a significant difference in 
the number of the two possible answers in the question on communicated content. I 
predicted that overall, there would be a significant difference: the number of answers 
“some but not all” would be significantly higher than the number of answers “at 
least some and maybe all.” I again based this prediction on the SC’s claim that folk 
intuitions do not differ much in casual and the courtroom contexts if there is no dif-
ference in (high) trust levels.
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By contrast, I suggested that participants who answered the trust question below 
the mid-point 4, which means that they distrusted the speaker’s utterance, would 
provide similar answers on the ex ante and ex post questions on probability of all 
objects having the property. Moreover, they would be more likely to choose the 
answer “At least some and maybe all of the objects have the property” to the ques-
tion on communicated content than the participants that trusted the speaker’s utter-
ance. Since this is a forced-choice question, I measured that with a non-parametric 
chi-square test. I compared whether there was a significant difference in the number 
of the two possible answers in the question on communicated content. I predicted 
that there would be no significant difference: the number of participants who chose 
the “some but not all” interpretation would be similar to the number of participants 
who chose the “at least some and maybe all” interpretation following Marmor’s 
interpretation described in Sect. 3.
6.6  Knowledge
Next, before proceeding to test the participants’ assessment of lying, I needed to 
restrict participants’ answers to those that would be legally relevant for perjury 
assessments. The jury instruction for perjury is that it has to be assessed whether 
the defendant “gave false answers knowing [emphasis added] the same to be false” 
[10].7
Thus, I needed an additional question on knowledge assessment so as to later 
restrict the analysis of lying assessment to only those participants that judged the 
protagonist as knowing how many objects had the relevant property:
To what extent do you agree with the following statement: ‘the main account-
ant knows how many invoices are unpaid’? (1 = completely disagree; 7 = completely 
agree).
6.7  Lying
Next, I presented participants with either the information:
It turns out that all of the invoices are unpaid.
Or with the information:
7 Note that, the 1911 UK Perjury Act and its 1975 revision state that:
 If any person, in giving any testimony (either orally or in writing) otherwise than on oath, where 
required to do so by an order under Sect.  2 of the Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act 
1975, makes a statement—
(a)   which he knows to be false in a material particular, or
(b)   which is false in a material particular and which he does not believe to be true,
 he shall be guilty of an offence….
 Given possibility (b), in the UK the knowledge criterion is more relaxed: a belief that the statement is 
not true is sufficient. However, the present paper focuses on the criteria enlisted in the Bronston case, in 
which, as indicated in the quotation, the knowledge criterion is important.
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It turns out that not all of the invoices are unpaid.8
I next asked participants a question on lying assessment:
To what extent do you agree with the following statement: ‘the main account-
ant’s utterance was a lie’? (1 = completely disagree; 7 = completely agree)
Technically speaking the notion of lying is not part of determining whether 
perjury occurred. However, the notion of lying is a natural language analogue for 
expressing responsibility for false statements. Thus, lay juries might have a tendency 
to follow closely their lying intuitions when adjudicating perjury. Consequently, a 
question on lying is in place.
I restricted the main analysis to datasets of participants presented with the infor-
mation “It turns out that all of the invoices are unpaid.” I suggested that on average, 
those who chose the answer “At least some and maybe all objects have the property” 
in the question on communicated content would judge the utterance as not being a 
lie, while those who chose the answer “Some but not all objects have the relevant 
property” in the question on communicated content would assess the utterance as 
a lie. This follows from the assumption that a speaker is held responsible only for 
content that she communicated. If the state of the world turns out contrary to com-
municated content can a speaker be assessed as a liar.
Moreover, in line with previous theoretical and experimental literature (cf. [1, 17, 
65, 83, 84]), there is always a fraction of the population, which judges a false impli-
cature not as a lie but as merely a misleading statement. However, this fraction of 
the population is less problematic for the present studies, as those who do not judge 
a false implicature as a lie, would most probably not judge the false implicature as 
perjury, though this remains an avenue for future studies. One could however raise a 
reverse worry: since there is no separate question on misleading being asked, a frac-
tion of participants might be conflating misleading with lying. These participants 
answer the lying question in the affirmative, even if they do not think the evaluated 
utterance was a lie, or they think a false implicature was less of a lie than a false 
statement. I acknowledge this worry and leave it as an avenue for future studies.
However, following the SC’s second worry, I suggested that patterns of lie ascrit-
pions would change if I considered only the answers of those who did not trust the 
speaker’s utterance (answers on the trust question below the mid-point 4) and chose 
the answer “at least some and maybe all of the objects have the relevant property” 
in the question on communicated content. Following the SC’s worry combined with 
8 Note that I first asked the question on knowledge and only later provided participants with the state of 
the world. This order, however, was not present in the Bronston case and other perjury cases: the jury 
already knew the state of the world when assessing the knowledge state of the defendant (if the state of 
the world conformed to the putative implicature content, then there would not even be a perjury case). 
The SC is right to worry that this is extremely shaky ground: the outcome or hindsight bias is well estab-
lished in psychology, and it is highly probable that the fact that a jury is presented with a state of the 
world contrary to the putative implicature might drive them to ascribe more knowledge to the defendant 
than they would ascribe if they did not know the state of the world in advance [6, 37]. Consequently, this 
could drive the jury to ascribe higher lying (or perjury) scores. The SC’s worries about lay intuitions on 
lying are far from being unfounded.
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Marmor’s prediction described in Sect. 3, I suggested that these participants would 
judge the utterance as a lie despite the fact that they did not infer the implicature: 
they would hold the speaker responsible for something she did not communicate. I 
measured this by checking with a one-sample t test whether the average answer on 
the lying question was different from the mid-point 4. I also checked whether par-
ticipants who gave all the same answers, except for the fact of being presented with 
the opposite information that “It turns out that not all of the invoices are unpaid,” 
did not judge the utterance as a lie.
If this turns out as predicted, then there arises the question as to the cause of this 
inconsistency: why hold someone responsible for something she did not communi-
cate? Is it merely because the state of the world turned contrary to the not inferred 
implicature?
I suggest here that even if these participants rated the utterance as communicat-
ing “At least some and maybe all objects have the property,” they thought that since 
it turned out that all the objects had the property, the speaker wanted to fool them 
and make them think that not all objects had the property: the utterance was a trap. 
In other words, since they judged the speaker as knowledgeable and did not trust the 
speaker, they retrospectively ascribed to the speaker a desire to mislead them.
6.8  Blame
If I am correct that participants ascribe an intent to mislead to the speaker, then par-
ticipants must ascribe a high level of blame to the speaker for uttering the sentence 
“Some of the objects have the property.” Consequently, to check whether this is the 
case, I asked an additional question about blame:
To what extent is the main accountant blameworthy, if at all, for uttering 
‘some of the invoices are unpaid’? (1 = not at all blameworthy; 7 = extremely 
blameworthy)
I predicted that levels of blame ascribed would be equally high for those participants 
that judged the speaker’s utterance as trustworthy and communicating that not all 
the objects had the property (because the speaker broke their trust) as well as for 
those participants that judged the speaker’s utterance as unworthy of trust and com-
municating that maybe all objects had the property. This is because after discovering 
the state of the world, participants retrospectively think that the speaker wanted to 
fool them [2, 6, 52].
6.9  Punishment
The SC is correct that the inference of an intent to mislead is an extremely shaky 
inference: we are never 100% sure that someone indeed knew and wanted to mis-
lead—perhaps the speaker’s utterance was just unintentionally misleading; perhaps 
the defendant was not sure how many invoices were unpaid; perhaps the defendant 
was waiting for the questioning lawyer to inquire further. In the SC’s own words:
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Under the pressures and tensions of interrogation, it is not uncommon for the 
most earnest witnesses to give answers that are not entirely responsive. Some-
times the witness does not understand the question or may in an excess of cau-
tion or apprehension read too much or too little into it [10].
Consequently, I asked a question on punishment to check whether participants 
wanted to punish the speaker despite an uncertainty as to the speaker’s mental state:
How much punishment, if any, does the main accountant deserve for uttering 
“some of the invoices are unpaid”? (1 = no punishment at all; 7 = severe pun-
ishment)
I suggested that punishment levels would follow blame levels and that, following 
the SC’s worry, participants would be prone to punish the speaker for her utterance 
(rating significantly above the mid-point 4). I suggested that this pattern would hold 
both for those participants that judged the speaker’s utterance as trustworthy and 
communicating that not all the objects had the property (because the speaker broke 
their trust and deserves punishment) as well as for those participants that judged 
the speaker’s utterance as distrustful and communicating that maybe all objects had 
the property (because the speaker wanted to fool them and deserves punishment) 
[16, 62].
To sum up, considerations of punishment attributions are external to questions of 
lying or perjury: they are neither part of the legal responsibility criteria for perjury 
nor part of the folk theory of lying. However, they can be central to issues such as 
betrayal of trust and/or of moral reprehensiveness. Consequently, I will investigate 
the impact of punishment attributions in relation to other tested dependent variables.
The survey ended with a comprehension control question and a demographic 
questionnaire. The overall experiment structure is presented in Table 2.
7  Experiment
7.1  Participants
The online Amazon Mechanical Turk platform was used to recruit 630 partici-
pants to complete the pre-registered9 survey for a small payment (0.25 USD). The 
number of participants was determined by a predictive power analysis carried out 
with the G-power software. With an effect size of Cohen’s d = 0.50, α = 0.05, and 
power = 0.95, an a priori power analysis recommends 105 participants per cell for an 
independent samples t test (two-tailed). I multiplied this value by 6 as there were 6 
conditions.
I filtered out participants who (1) were not native speakers of the English lan-
guage, (2) did not pass the attention check, (3) took less than one minute to complete 
9 Link to preregistration: https ://aspre dicte d.org/blind .php?x=ys5us 4. Link to repository:  https ://osf.io/
h7fvd /?view_only=46342 fd914 ca408 b98e9 1eaee 94ffe af.
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the entire survey, or (4) did not answer the comprehension control question at the 
end of the survey correctly. After filtering, 489 participants remained (50% female, 
mean age 40 years, SD = 13 years, range 19–84 years).
7.2  Methods and Materials
The experiment was between-subjects with six conditions: three context type (neu-
tral vs. courtroom without a motive to lie vs. courtroom with a motive to lie) times 
two state of the world (all vs. not all objects having the relevant property).
After passing the attention check, all participants were presented with the follow-
ing vignette:
Invoices for more than a 1,000,000 USD found in the documentation of com-
panies in bankruptcy proceedings are almost always unpaid. A paid invoice 
of this kind is an extreme rarity. On the table, there are five invoices for more 
than 1,000,000 USD from a company undergoing bankruptcy proceedings.
Next each participant had to answer a question on ex ante (before being presented 
with the utterance) probability of all objects having the relevant property on a slider 
scale ranging from 0 to 100 (as probabilities are naturally measured in terms of 
percentage):
On a scale from 0 (completely unlikely) to 100 (certain) how likely is it that all 
of the invoices are unpaid?
Thereafter, participants were presented with the exact same utterance but were split 
into three groups. The first group was presented with a scenario from a neutral, 
non-courtroom context, while the second group saw a scenario from a courtroom 
Table 2  Order of questions in the overall experiment structure
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context. The third group was presented with the exact same courtroom context as the 
second group but with an addition of a motive (reason) to lie (for ease of presenta-
tion, this context type will be labeled “motive” further in the paper). For the neutral 
context, the vignette read:
Imagine a conversation at the company headquarters. The main accountant of 
the company says in reply to the boss’ question during the conversation at the 
company’s headquarters: ‘Some of the invoices are unpaid.’
For the courtroom context without explicit motive, an only slightly altered vignette 
was presented:
Imagine a courtroom hearing. The main accountant of the company says in 
reply to the judge’s question during the courtroom hearing: ‘Some of the 
invoices are unpaid.’
Finally, for the “courtroom context with motive” group, the vignette read:
Imagine a courtroom hearing. The main accountant of the company undergo-
ing the bankruptcy proceedings has interest in claiming that there is a paid 
invoice because this increases his chances of receiving substantial remuner-
ation before the company is declared bankrupt. The main accountant of the 
company says in reply to the judge’s question during the courtroom hearing: 
‘Some of the invoices are unpaid.’
Next, all three groups were asked an identical set of questions. First, each partici-
pant answered a question on the ex post probability of all objects having the relevant 
property on a slider scale 0–100:
Now, on a scale from 0 (completely unlikely) to 100 (certain) how likely is it 
that all of the invoices are unpaid?
After answering the probability question, participants were asked a forced-choice 
question on the content communicated by the utterance:
When uttering “Some of the invoices are unpaid” the main accountant wanted 
to communicate that: (a) only some but not all of the invoices are unpaid. (b) at 
least some and maybe all of the invoices are unpaid.
The order of presentation of the forced-choice answers was randomized. Next, par-
ticipants answered all the remaining questions on a 1–7 Likert scale:
To what extent is the main accountant’s utterance trustworthy? (1 = not at all 
trustworthy; 7 = completely trustworthy)
To what extent do you agree with the following statement: ‘the main account-
ant knows how many invoices are unpaid’? (1 = completely disagree; 7 = 
completely agree)
After answering the question on trust and knowledge, participants were either pre-
sented with the information “It turns out that all of the invoices are unpaid” or with 
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the information “It turns out that not all of the invoices are unpaid.” Next, partici-
pants answered the following questions:
To what extent do you agree with the following statement: ‘the main account-
ant’s utterance was a lie’? (1 = completely disagree; 7 = completely agree)
To what extent is the main accountant blameworthy, if at all, for uttering 
‘some of the invoices are unpaid’? (1 = not at all blameworthy; 7 = extremely 
blameworthy)
How much punishment, if any, does the main accountant deserve for uttering 
“some of the invoices are unpaid”? (1 = no punishment at all; 7 = severe pun-
ishment)
Finally, participants answered a comprehension check question. The survey ended 
with a demographic questionnaire.10
7.3  Results
7.3.1  Ex Ante
The mean ex ante probability ratings were above 50 points in all three context types: 
the lowest rating was 68.63 in the neutral context type (cf. Table  2). This result 
means that there was no risk that participants would later confound in the answers 
on ex post probability a belief in the speaker’s words (that there is a low probability 
of all objects having the property) with a prior belief that there is very little chance 
that all objects would have the relevant property.
7.3.2  Ex Post
In a paired samples t test, I compared answers on ex ante and ex post probabilities 
from the same participants (within subjects) for all three contexts groups separately 
(neutral vs. courtroom without motive vs. courtroom with a motive). There was a 
significant difference for all three groups, and the effect size of the difference was 
only somewhat reduced for the courtroom context with a motive. While the assess-
ment of the likelihood that all the objects had the relevant property was around 50 
points for the neutral and courtroom scenarios, it rose to around 60 points in the 
motive scenario. Cf. Table 3.
7.3.3  Communicated Content
The majority of participants inferred the implicature because the majority took the 
utterance as communicating “some but not all” of the invoices are unpaid.
10 At the end of the survey, I asked a comprehension check question to ensure that participants under-
stood the context manipulation:
 Where did the conversation take place? (a) At the company. (b) In a courtroom.
 The order of answer presentations was randomized.
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The percentage of participants who chose the two alternative answers to the ques-
tion on communicated content for different contexts is presented in Table 4 together 
with a chi-square test depicting the significant difference between the number of 
participants choosing some but not all versus maybe all (all ps < 0.001).
7.3.4  The Influence of Trust and Knowledge
Crucially, in line with our hypothesis, in all three context types, participants that 
judged the protagonist as knowing (answers above the mid-point 4) as well as 
answering that they did not trust the utterance (answers below the mid-point 4) 
ascribed highest ex ante and ex post probabilities of all objects having the property 
(cf. Table 5). The highest scores were in the motive context (cf. Table 5).
Moreover, in line with the prediction, in the “courtroom with motive” context 
type, participants chose the answer “at least some and maybe all” to the question on 
communicated content 42% of the time, which is descriptively higher than the other 
context types. In a chi-square test, I found no significant difference between the two 
types of answers. A similar pattern (no significant difference) occurred in the neutral 
Table 3  Paired samples t test comparing the difference in assessment of the probability of all objects 
having the relevant property before and after hearing utterance for each of the three context types
95% confidence intervals are given for the means
Context Mean ex ante (SD) Mean ex post (SD) Ex ante versus ex post
t(df) p Cohen’s d 95% CI
Neutral 68.63 (31.83) 54.35 (29.77) 4.88 (171)  < .001 .37 [8.50;20.05]
Courtroom 69.69 (30.58) 52.75 (31.54) 5.44 (165)  < .001 .42 [10.80;23.09]
Motive 76.57 (29.06) 63.64 (31.89) 4.29 (150)  < .001 .35 [6.97;18.90]
Table 4  Percentage of 
participants that judged the 
communicated content as either 
“some but not all” or “at least 
some and maybe all” in the 
three context types as well as 




Maybe all (%) χ2 (df) p
Neutral 66 34 16.95 (1)  < .001
Courtroom 69 31 24.68 (1)  < .001
Motive 65 35 13.41 (1)  < .001
























ex ante ex post
Fig. 1  Mean ratings of ex ante and ex post probability depending on trust judgment and context type. 
Error bars depict the standard error of the mean
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context: inference of intent to mislead (knowledge and low trust ascription) made it 
less likely that the implicature would be inferred through the choice of the “at least 
some and maybe all” answer to the question on communicated content (cf. Table 6).
In a one-way ANOVA, I compared the answers on trust and knowledge between 
the three context types and found an effect of context type on trust and knowledge; 
cf. Table 7.
Following my predictions, for the knowledge assessment of the protagonist, 
there was a significant difference between average answers from the neutral and the 
courtroom context, while no difference occurred between the courtroom and motive 
contexts (cf. Table 8). Knowledge assessment increased in the courtroom context as 
compared to the neutral context (cf. Table 9).
In contrast, trust assessment decreased in the courtroom without explicit motive 
context (cf. Table  8). There was a significant difference between average trust 
assessment in the neutral and the courtroom without explicit motive contexts. There 
Table 5  Paired samples t test comparing the difference in assessment of the probability of all objects 
having the relevant property before and after hearing the utterance in three context types
This is data restricted to participants who ascribed knowledge over mid-point 4 and trust below mid-
point 4. 95% confidence intervals are given for the means
Context Mean ex ante (SD) Mean ex post (SD) Ex ante versus ex post
t(df) p Cohen’s d 95% CI N
Neutral 74.29 (34.33) 77.08 (4.42)  − .36 (23) .725 .07 [− 19.03;13.45] 24
Courtroom 72.28 (36.23) 62.03 (30.64) 1.58 (35) .124 .26 [− 2.95;23.45] 36
Motive 81.51 (29.05) 79.42 (23.08) .40 (44) .690 .06 [− 8.40;12.58] 45
Table 6  Percentage of participants that judged the communicated content as either “some but not all” or 
“at least some and maybe all” in the three context types as well as chi-square test results comparing the 
number of answers
This data is restricted to participants who ascribed knowledge over mid-point 4 and trust below mid-
point 4
Some but not all (%) Maybe all (%) χ2(df) p
Neutral 62 38 1.50 (1) .221
Courtroom 69 31 5.44 (1) .020
Motive 58 42 1.09 (1) .297
Table 7  One-way ANOVA to 
compare influence of context 




Trust 4.20 (2) .016
Knowledge 4.57 (2) .011
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was no difference between the courtroom without explicit motive and the courtroom 
with explicit motive contexts (cf. Table 8).
7.4  Lying
Next, I analyzed the answers of participants who were presented with the informa-
tion “It turns out that all of the invoices were unpaid.” I restricted the analysis to 
datasets where the knowledge judgment was above the midpoint 4 on the Likert 
scale.
As predicted, for all three contexts, participants who judged the communicated 
content as “at least some and maybe all” judged the protagonist as not lying, while 
those who judged the communicated content as “some but not all” judged the pro-
tagonist as lying; cf. Table 10.
Next, I compared the above answers on the lying question depending on whether 
the trust judgment was above or below the midpoint 4. I explored the variation of 
lying judgments depending on both ascribed communicated content and ascribed 
trust.
For the neutral context, trust did not affect lying judgments: regardless of whether 
participants trusted the protagonist, they judged her as lying if they ascribed to her 
the communicated content “some but not all,” while they judged her as not lying if 
they ascribed to her the content “at least some and maybe all.” An identical pattern 
occurred for the courtroom context (cf. Table 11 and Fig. 2). By contrast, for the 
context containing a motive, judgments of lies for those who judged the utterance as 
communicating “some but not all” differed significantly depending on whether they 
trusted the protagonist. If participants trusted the protagonist, they judged her as not 
lying, while if they distrusted her, they found she lied.
Table 8  Independent samples t tests comparing average knowledge and trust assessment in between the 
three context types
95% confidence intervals are given for the means
Trust Knowledge
T(df) p d 95% CI T(df) p d 95%CI
Neutral versus courtroom 2.10 (270) .037 .25 [.02;.68]  − 2.65 (270) .008 .32 [− .77; − .11]
Courtroom versus motive 1.26 (267) .209 .15 [− .14;.62] .09 (267) .926 .01 [− .29;.32]
Table 9  Average trust and 
knowledge assessment in 
all three contexts; standard 
deviation from the mean is 
indicated in brackets
Trust (SD) Knowledge (SD)
Neutral 4.75 (1.30) 5.52 (1.44)
Courtroom 4.40 (1.46) 5.96 (1.30)
Motive 4.16 (1.66) 5.95 (1.26)
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Moreover, even those who judged the utterance as communicating “at least some 
and maybe all” exhibited a difference in lie assessment depending on the level of 
trust: the effect size of the difference is medium: .69 (cf. Table 11). In line with the 
bias suspicion, participants first judged the utterance as communicating that perhaps 
all objects had the property, and later, when they were presented with the informa-
tion that all the objects indeed had the property, they judged the protagonist as lying, 
so they held her responsible for something she did not communicate. This is unfair: 
responsibility for perjury is responsibility for content that the speaker communi-
cated (or at least was ascribed to be communicating). Otherwise, how can a speaker 
believe content to be false if she is not communicating it in the first place? 
For these participants, the mean lying judgment was 5.18, SD = 2.27, though 
the mean was only borderline significantly different from mid-point 4: t(8) = 2.29, 
p = .056. Thus, the analyzed participants had a tendency toward holding the protago-
nist responsible for something they thought she did not communicate. They did not 
do so if presented with the information that it turned out that not all the objects 
had the property: M = 2.2, SD = 1.81; significant difference from mid-point four 
t(9) =  − 3.14, p = .012, 95% CI [− 3.10; − .50].
7.4.1  Blame
Finally, I checked whether the above-described dependence of lying judgments 
on trust levels was reflected in participants’ assessment of blame and punishment. 
Contrary to predictions, it is not that if one breaks trust, then one is more blame-
worthy, but rather that the less one is trusted, the more one is blamed for lying, 
and the more one is trusted, the less one is blamed for lying. For instance, for the 
motive context, where the effect was strongest, if participants chose the answer on 
communicated content “some but not all,” if they trusted the speaker’s words, they 
rated lies and blame on average as 4.15 and 4.85 respectively. The blame judgment 
Table 10  One sample t test 
checking difference of lying 
judgment from mid-point 4 
depending on the chosen answer 
on communicated content
The data is restricted to participants who were presented with the 
information “It turns out that all of the invoices were unpaid” and 
assessed the protagonist as knowing how many invoices were unpaid 






Mean Difference from 
midpoint 4
Mean Difference from 
midpoint 4
T(df) p T(df) p
Neutral 3.95  − .11 (20) .914 5.31 4.51 (41)  < .001
Courtroom 3.67  − .81 (17) .430 5.31 4.48 (41)  < .001
Motive 4.52 1.16 (20) .259 5.12 3.57 (40) .001
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was not significantly different from the midpoint 4: t(10) = 2.04, p = .068, 95% CI 
[− .07;1.71].
By contrast, when they did not trust the speaker’s words, they rated lies and 
blame as 6.05 and 6.38, respectively. The blame judgment was significantly dif-
ferent from the mid-point 4: t(8) = 10.09, p < 0.001, 95% CI [1.89; 3.00] (cf. 
Table 12).
In the motive context, participants who judged the protagonist as communi-
cating “some and maybe all”, as well as distrusted the speaker, also judged the 
protagonist as lying and blameworthy. In line with our hypothesis, I suggest par-
ticipants did so because they blamed the protagonist for trying to mislead the 
audience with the utterance: participants ascribed the protagonist an intent to 
mislead.
These findings indicate that assessments of lying are at least as much moral 
judgments as epistemic ones. Moreover, this goes against both the theory of lies 
and the theoretical construction of the institution of perjury. This is because, the-
oretically speaking, intention to mislead is taken as less blameworthy than inten-
tion to deceive. Intention to mislead is not an intention to lie (cf. for instance 
Table 11  Independent samples t test comparing mean lying judgments depending on level of trust 
(yes = above the mid-point 4 vs no = below the midpoint 4) and ascribed communicated content for par-
ticipants who judged the protagonist as knowing how many objects had the property and were presented 
with the information that it turned out that all the objects had the property in question
I checked each context type separately. 95% confidence intervals are given for the means
Influence of trust on lies
Communicated content: maybe all Communicated content: not all
T(df) p d 95% CI T(df) p d 95%CI
Neutral  − .07 (19) .947 .03 [− 2.13;1.99]  − .29 (40) .770 .10 [− 1.55;1.15]
Courtroom 0 (16) 1.00 0 [− 1.91;1.91]  − .91 (40) .369 .30 [− 1.79;.68]
Motive  − 1.59 (19) .128 .69 [.87; − 3.20]  − 3.39 (39) .002 1.06 [− 3.03; − .76]





























no trusttrust no trusttrust
Fig. 2  Mean lying judgments depending on level of trust and ascribed communicated content for par-
ticipants who judged the protagonist as knowing how many objects had the property and were presented 
with the information that it turned out that all the objects had the property in question. I compare each 
context type separately. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean
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[65]). Moreover, the only thing that counts for perjury ascriptions according to 
the SC is whether the speaker believed her answer to be true. Consequently, this 
apparent influence of moral judgment on epistemic judgment could be considered 
a bias.
7.4.2  Punishment
Contrary to predictions, for participants that judged the protagonist as knowledge-
able and were presented with the information that all objects had the property, pun-
ishment levels were not pronounced, regardless of trust and communicated con-
tent; they never rose significantly above the mid-point 4: participants tended to be 
unwilling to punish the protagonist for her words M = 4.08, SD = 1.81, t(208) = .65, 
p = .515 (cf. Table 12).
7.5  Discussion
On average, for all three tested context types (neutral vs. courtroom with no motive 
to lie vs. courtroom with a motive to lie), participants inferred the implicature “some 
but not all” because they answered that the protagonist’s utterance communicated 
that “some but not all” of the objects had the relevant property. Thus, the SC’s worry 
that participants would not make a sharp distinction between casual and courtroom 
contexts is well founded. Moreover, there was a significant difference between their 
judgments of probability of all objects having the relevant property before and after 
being presented with the utterance; participants’ beliefs on what was communicated 
with the utterance and on the state of the world were congruent. This means that on 
average, participants believed in the speaker’s words and inferred that not all the 
objects had the property in question.
By contrast, this pattern reversed when the analysis was restricted to participants 
that judged the protagonist as knowing how many objects had the property (judg-
ment above mid-point 4) and indicated that the protagonist’s words could not be 
trusted (judgment below mid-point 4). These participants judged the probability of 
all objects having the property before and after hearing the utterance as similar—
i.e. they did not update their initial belief on the basis of the speaker’s utterance. 
Moreover, the highest number of such participants was in the motive context where 
the level of trust was lowest. Just as Marmor suggested, these participants were also 
the most prone to judge the protagonist’s utterance as communicating “At least some 
and maybe all of the objects have the property,” which I take as a lack of infer-
ence of the scalar implicature of “some” (a chi-square test revealed no significant 
difference between the number of answers “some but not all” and “at least some 
and maybe all” in the question on communicated content). Thus, the results provide 
some support for Marmor’s interpretation of the Bronston’s case.
As predicted, in the two courtroom context types (courtroom and courtroom with 
a motive to lie), there were higher knowledge ascriptions and lower trust ascriptions 
than in the third neutral context type.
1 3





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Among those participants that judged the protagonist as knowing how many 
invoices were unpaid (ratings above the mid-point 4) and were presented with the 
information that it turned out that all the objects had the relevant property, for all 
three context types, participants who judged the communicated content as “at least 
some and maybe all” judged the protagonist as not lying, while those who judged 
the communicated content as “some but not all” judged the protagonist as lying. 
Thus, just as the Supreme Court in the Bronston ruling suggested, there is a robust 
folk intuition that a false implicature in the courtroom is a lie.
However, I observe a worrying influence of trust levels on lie assessment in the 
motive context: among those participants that judged the protagonist as knowing, 
judged the utterance’s communicated content as “some but not all,” and were pre-
sented with the information “It turns out that all of the objects have the relevant 
property,” those who trusted the protagonist judged her as truthful, while those who 
did not trust her judged her as lying. The same pattern was reflected in blame assess-
ment. Surprisingly, it is not that if one breaks trust then one is more blameworthy, 
but rather the less one is trusted, the more one is blamed for lying, and the more one 
is trusted, the less one is blamed for lying.
Moreover, I observe another worrying influence of trust levels on lie assess-
ment in the motive context: participants that judged the protagonist as knowledge-
able, distrustful, and communicating “At least some and maybe all objects have the 
property” and that were presented with the information that it turned out that all 
the objects had the property judged the protagonist as lying (borderline significance 
from mid-point 4). In other words, they held her responsible for content she did not 
communicate. This was reflected in blame judgments: participants most probably 
blamed the protagonist for trying to fool them; they ascribed to the protagonist an 
intent to mislead.
Contrary to predictions, participants were unwilling to punish the protagonist for 
her words in all conditions.
8  General Discussion
In the case of the utterance containing the word “some,” that typically generates sca-
lar implicature (‘not all’), there is a robust folk intuition in the present study across 
all tested contexts that a false implicature is a lie. This goes against previous experi-
mental findings (cf. [17, 83, 84]). Perhaps the present results are a consequence of 
not asking a separate question on misleading: if misleading and lying were differen-
tiated in the experimental setting, perhaps participants would judge the utterance as 
misleading rather than a lie. This remains an avenue for future investigation.
Most participants judged the protagonist as communicating that not all the objects 
had the property. When presented with the information that it turned out that all the 
objects had the property, participants judged the protagonist as having uttered a lie 
in all three tested context types. Thus, the SC’s first major worry that participants do 
not make a sharp distinction between casual and courtroom contexts is well founded.
The second main worry of the SC, that participants will behave inconsistently 
in the presence of a motive to lie ascribed to the speaker due to low trust levels, is 
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also well founded. When the dataset is restricted to participants that do not trust the 
speaker’s words, in the motive context, roughly half of participants behave as Mar-
mor predicted: that is, participants refrain from implicature inference. The remain-
ing participants behave as Bianchi predicted. They infer the implicature yet disbe-
lieve the speaker.
Moreover, there are two main patterns of lie ascriptions that are inconsistent in 
the motive context. The first one concerns Marmor’s and the SC’s worry: partici-
pants judge the utterance as communicating that maybe all objects have the property. 
Next, when presented with the information that it turns out that indeed all objects 
have the property, they judge the protagonist as lying. This means that they hold the 
protagonist responsible for content she did not communicate. These participants also 
judge the protagonist as knowledgeable and ascribe a low trust level toward the pro-
tagonist’s words. Finally, these same participants ascribe a high blame level. For this 
reason, I suppose that they ascribe to the protagonist an intent to mislead (cf. Fig. 3).
Our interpretation of this result should be treated with caution and requires 
further investigation, yet I suppose that these participants treat the speaker’s utter-
ance as a trap that is supposed to fool them into thinking that not all the objects 
have the property, even though they do not fall into this trap, and thus perhaps the 
utterance should be treated as at best misleading rather than an outright lie. Since 
the mens rea for intention is constituted of knowledge plus desire (the so-called 
cognitive and volitional elements, cf. for instance [59], I take the distrust ascrip-
tion as a substitute for an ascription of a desire to mislead. If knowledge is also 
ascribed to the protagonist, then this together with the distrust ascription gener-
ates an ascription of an intent to mislead. The ascription of intent to mislead in 
turn influences the lying judgment, though, as the SC noted, it should not (Fig. 4).
Moreover, what if the speaker is just not sure of her words or has not really con-
sidered what her utterance implicates, as suggested by the SC (cf. Section 6.9, [10]?
Our results suggest that the SC is right that a distrusted witness might later be 
held responsible for implicatures that she did not genuinely intend or think of. 
After all, not every witness under oath has an intent to mislead, while many are 
stressed by the rather unusual setting of a witness cross-examination [3]. This is 
especially pressing given the maxim that a motive to act should be irrelevant to 
responsibility if one is not certain that the defendant acted upon the motive (cf. 
for instance [53, 59]).
The second worrying inconsistency in folk intuitions about perjury also con-
cerns the motive context. This worry is even more serious because it concerns the 
majority of participants in the experiment. Namely, participants that judged the 
utterance as communicating that not all the objects had the property, after being 
presented with the information that it turned out that all the objects had the prop-
erty, judged the utterance as a lie merely on average. This is because if these par-
ticipants are split into two groups—those who trusted and those who distrusted 
the speaker’s utterance—only those who distrusted judged the utterance as a lie. 
A trusted speaker is not judged as a liar even though her utterance communicates 
a content contrary to the state of the world. This is worrying because trust is an 
emotional variable that is easily manipulable [15, 30, 38, 42]. Empirical research 
suggests that an initial trust assessment upon first encounter is later extremely 
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difficult to alter [88]. Further research suggests that the speaker’s face, under-
stood as the speaker’s political views and attributed social role, as well as trust, 
can influence linguistic judgments [9, 61, 73, 74]. In addition to all this, experi-
mental studies confirm that the speaker’s presumed competence or impairment 
also influences utterance interpretation in a systematic way [29].
As previously stated, surprising pattern also concerns blame ascriptions: it is 
not that if one breaks trust then one is more blameworthy, but rather the less one 
is trusted, the more one is blamed for lying, and the more one is trusted, the less 
one is blamed for lying (Fig. 5).
Finally, it should be emphasized that in adversarial systems such as the American 
system, there is more leniency toward misleading statements because during witness 
cross-examination, it is the duty of the questioning lawyer to precisely inquire about 
the crucial elements of the case: “Precise questioning is imperative as a predicate for 
the offense of perjury” [10].
This, however, is less present in Continental systems, where the influence of trust 
might therefore be even more worrying.11 In other words, since in continental legal 
systems there is no witness cross-examination practice, perhaps the witness has 
more of a duty to answer the question precisely, while still having no obligation to 
reveal extra information. If this is the case, then, based on our experimental results, 
a trusted witness might be treated more leniently than an untrusted one, even if both 
communicate the same content. On the other hand, however, even in common law 
systems, the witness has a responsibility to answer questions:
‘(…) a witness is required to give relevant and relatively complete responses, 
and we should be able to interpret the answer accordingly. Were it not so, the 
entire questioning process would collapse. On the other hand, the nature of the 
Fig. 3  Model of ascriptions of intent to mislead
Fig. 4  Influence of motive on trust and lying ascriptions
11 As the SC notes in Bronston: “Montesquieu took as his starting point the French tradition of capital 
punishment for perjury and the relatively mild English punishment of the pillory. He thought the dispar-
ity between the punishments could be explained because the French did not permit the accused to present 
his own witnesses, while in England ‘they admit of witnesses on both sides, and the affair is discussed 
in some measure between them; consequently false witness is there less dangerous, the accused having 
a remedy against the false witnesses, which he has not in France.’ Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, 
quoted in Study of Perjury, supra [p. 253., 10]
1 3
Modelling Perjury: Between Trust and Blame 
adversarial process suggests that it is the questioning lawyer’s job to ensure 
that responses comply with these requirements. But who do we blame when, 
as seems to have happened in Bronston, the witness intentionally gives an 
unresponsive answer to create a false impression of responsiveness? Do we let 
Bronston’s creditors go uncompensated because their lawyer’s trial skills were 
not sufficiently honed, or do we prosecute the witness for perjury to discourage 
deceitful conduct?
We believe that the most practical solution is to require the lawyer to clarify 
unresponsive answers, as the Supreme Court suggested, but only when it is 
reasonably evident to the lawyer that the answer may not be responsive. If we 
interpret the question in Bronston as asking about personal bank accounts in 
Switzerland, it should have been evident to the examining lawyer that Bron-
ston’s reply about company bank accounts was not responsive to the ques-
tion. While in ordinary conversation this would lead the hearer to infer that 
Bronston had no personal accounts in Switzerland, this was a legal setting, and 
therefore the lawyer should have probed further.’ [67]
9  Conclusion
In the present study folk intuitions about perjury appear to be fairly robust: in the 
tested case false implicatures are judged as lies, though lies that do not deserve pun-
ishment. However, the Supreme Court’s worry, expressed in the Bronston case, that 
folk intuitions about perjury do not differ between casual and courtroom contexts, 
even though for various reasons they should, is also well founded. In the courtroom, 
it is the duty of the cross-examining lawyer to precisely inquire about central mat-
ters, while there is no such duty in casual contexts.
Moreover, a more careful analysis of the data reveals that participants who dis-
trust the speaker’s utterance tend to hold the speaker responsible for content she did 
not communicate. They do so because they retrospectively ascribe to the speaker an 
intent to mislead them. This, however, is an irrelevant (non-material) element of the 
offense of perjury.
We also find a second worrying influence of trust on lying ascriptions in the 
courtroom: a trusted speaker is exculpated from lying even if the implication drawn 
from her words turns out to be false. By contrast, a distrusted speaker is judged in 
the exact same circumstances as a liar.
Since trust is an emotional variable, which is easy to manipulate with various 
elements, including a putative motive, we should follow the SC’s warning and be 
extremely cautious with trust toward jury-issued perjury judgments.
Fig. 5  Influence of trust on blame and lying ascriptions
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